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Abstract:  
In this paper, we build a model of agrarian economies in which a kleptocratic 
government taxes farmers to maximize its life-time utility. The model is  a dynamic 
general equilibrium model in which the subsistence of farmers requires a minimum 
level of consumption. We analyze the effect that a benevolent food aid agency can 
have in such an environment. If it expects the food aid agency to intervene, the 
kleptocratic government will starve its farmers, in a clear case of the Samaritan’s 
dilemma. We show that the likelihood of man-made famines, however, can be greatly 
reduced if the food aid agency intervenes with probability slightly lower than one. No 
aid agency devoted to saving lives, however, can commit to such policy. We propose 
a solution to this food aid curse. 
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Introduction
The mere existence of aid agencies generates a need for aid. This fact is known as the
Samaritan’s dilemma and it was first highlighted by Buchanan (1975). An agency devoted to
fighting poverty in developing countries, for example, is likely to unwillingly generate poverty
as candidate recipient countries strive to qualify for aid (Pedersen, 2001; Hagen, 2006). The
dilemma is particularly striking in the case of food aid agencies committed to saving lives in
famine-stricken countries. We show, in this paper, that the availability of food aid is indeed
an important determinant of man-made famines. Clearly, a withdrawal of aid agencies would
solve the dilemma. But aid agencies cannot commit not to intervene. A humanitarian aid
agency, whose objective is to minimize deaths from hunger, will always respond to famines
(even man-made ones) if it has the means to do so. We also show that a simple policy in
which the agency commits to intervene with a probability less than one could remove the
temptation for an opportunistic ruler to starve his population. This policy, however, is not
credible. The agency faces a time inconsistency problem a` la Kydland & Prescott (1977),
which makes commitment unachievable. Indeed, whenever hunger is detected ex post, the
agency will intervene with probability one if its budget permits. We call this commitment
problem the food aid curse.
We propose a solution to this curse, which involves gifts to well-behaved rulers and a
punishment phase for a defiant ruler involving all other parties. Our solution therefore
implies a general penal code in the sense of Abreu (1988). In the vast literature on the role
of food aid,1 we offer another possible explanation: food aid may serve as a necessary bribe
to avoid man-made famines.
Several papers address the political economy of institutions in the presence of develop-
ment aid. Drazen (1999) builds a case for withholding aid transfers as a means to trigger
political change. Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier (2004) show how kleptocrats are capable of
remaining in power in the absence of a powerful support base, and the importance of foreign
aid in implementing their strategy. Svensson (2000) shows that rent-seeking is exacerbated
by expectations of foreign aid, but that this effect can be mitigated if the aid agency can
1See Isenman & Singer (1977) Srinivasan (1989), Gupta, Clements, & Tiongson (2004), Abdulai, Barrett,
& Hazell (2004), Barrett & Maxwell (2005) for important contributions to this literature.
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commit to an optimal policy. In this paper, we take the institution as given and show how
efficient behavior can be obtained even though the aid agency’s humanitarian agenda makes
it incapable of withholding aid.
Economists have long been interested in the origins of famines. Sen (1981) demonstrated
the fact that famines do not necessarily imply a shortage of food. In our paper, they follow
solely from human behavior, i.e. the greed of kleptocrats and their opportunistic behavior
in the presence of aid agencies. Our analysis is in line with Ravallion (1997)’s claim that
economics is essential in understanding famines.
We work within an infinite-horizon, dynamic model featuring a number of countries, each
ruled by a kleptocrat who has the ability to expropriate its citizens’ output. We analyze
the effect of introducing into this world a humanitarian aid agency with a given food aid
bank. There is no interaction among dictators in this paper. For a look at how dictators
(or warlords) interact strategically with an aid agency while in conflict with each other see
Blouin & Pallage (2007).
1 Benchmark model
The world is composed of N countries i ∈ {1, ..., N}, each ruled by an infinitely-lived klep-
tocratic dictator. Time is discrete. A country is made of a continuum of farmers of initial
measure 1. Every farmer produces y = 1 of the unique consumption good. Farmers have
no alternative than to work for the dictator, who taxes away their output. Their survival
requires a minimal consumption of c¯ every period. A dying farmer is never replaced. The
cost of starving one’s population is therefore borne over an infinite horizon.
A given dictator i cares solely about his consumption stream over time, {cit}
∞
t=0. He
maximizes the following objective:
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(cit) (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a time discount factor.
Given his objective and the lack of outside options for farmers, there is no reason why
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the kleptocrat would pay farmers an amount in excess of c¯. Hence if kleptocrat i allows a
fraction sit of his population to survive from time t to t + 1, his consumption at t is:
cit = sit(1− c¯) + (1− sit) = 1− sitc¯ . (2)
If nit is country i’s population at time t, the population next period will thus be ni,t+1 =
sitnit.
Our benchmark environment is one in which no aid agency exists to provide relief to
starving farmers. In this case, the typical kleptocrat solves the following Bellman equation
in which we drop time subscripts and use primes to denote future states:
V b(ni) = max
si∈[0,1]
ln[ni(1− sic¯)] + βV
b(sini) (3)
Problem (3) has the following solution:
Proposition 1 (Benchmark) If β ≥ c¯, the kleptocrats do not starve anyone (si(ni) =
1 for all i). If β < c¯, the kleptocrats starve a constant fraction 1− β/c¯ of their population
every period.
Proof. The solution to Problem (3) is easily obtained using the guess-and-verify method of
standard dynamic programming. 2
Because the cost of starving a farmer has to be borne over an infinite horizon, if β is
sufficiently high (β ≥ c¯), this cost outweighs the one-shot gain from consuming an additional
c¯. In that case, we have a corner solution si(ni) = 1 and V
b(ni) = 1/(1 − β) ln[ni(1 − c¯)].
Otherwise, the policy function is si(ni) = β/c¯ and the value function can be written as
V b(ni) = 1/(1 − β) ln(ni) + K, where K = 1/(1 − β) ln(1 − β) + β/(1 − β)
2 ln(β/c¯) is a
constant.
2 Food aid
The existence of a food aid agency committed to saving lives from starvation is likely to
perturb the equilibrium choices of the kleptocrats. We assume hereafter that the aid agency
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has a constant budget B every period. We can think of B as a basket of perishable food or,
as in most public administration offices, as a budget which expires at the end of the fiscal
year. We assume that the aid agency always prefers spending less to achieve the same goal.
2.1 Samaritan’s dilemma
We begin by considering the case where the agency acts non-strategically. By this we mean
that the agency makes no threats: it merely reacts to kleptocrats’ actions by saving all
lives or expending its entire budget. With a per-period budget of B, the agency can save
n˜ ≡ B/(Nc¯) people per country per period, assuming each country gets an equal share. We
shall in fact assume symmetric equilibrium throughout. If each country has a population
no greater than n˜ (i.e. if the agency’s budget is large enough to save everyone), then the
Bellman equation for each ruler becomes
V (ni) = max
si∈[0,1]
ln[ni(1− sic¯)] + βV (ni) (4)
In this case, we face a pure Samaritan’s dilemma:
Proposition 2a If the aid agency acts non-strategically (see above) and ni = n ≤ n˜ for all
i, then in equilibrium each kleptocrat i ∈ {1, ..., N} chooses si(ni) = 0.
The mere presence of a food aid agency either generates or exacerbates man-made famines.
Although well-intentioned, the agency’s commitment relieves the dictator of the cost of
starving his population. Hence the dictator’s objective becomes a decreasing fraction of si.
If the agency has a limited budget, i.e. if ni = n > n˜ for all i, then in a symmetric
equilibrium each kleptocrat will find it optimal to set si(ni) > 0. The formal result is
Proposition 2b If the aid agency acts non-strategically and ni = n > n˜ for all i, then in
equilibrium each kleptocrat i ∈ {1, ..., N} chooses
si(ni) =


1− n˜/n if β ≥ c¯;
s∗(ni) if β < c¯;
(5)
where s∗(ni) is defined in the appendix.
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The result is derived in the appendix. If β ≥ c¯ the population remains constant, since
dictators starve exactly the number of people that the agency can save. If β < c¯, on the
other hand, then the dictators’ impatience makes them starve more people than the agency
can save: population decreases as a result, until it reaches n˜, which it does in finite time.
Once population reaches n˜, each dictator sets si(n˜) = 0, as expected from Proposition 2a.
The Samaritan’s dilemma is the same as that facing most international aid agencies. Yet
for most aid agencies, there is a simple solution to that dilemma. It involves a commitment
not to intervene in case of a dictator’s bad behavior. Although a commitment to non-action
may be difficult to obtain, even in the context of development aid, it is arguably a lot
easier than in the case of humanitarian aid. Indeed, if development aid agencies strive for
the development of many recipients, their goal can always be attained if they substitute a
well-behaved recipient for an ill-behaved one. Committing not to act is impossible for a
humanitarian aid agency whose objective is to save lives.
Yet, solving the Samaritan’s dilemma does not necessarily imply such a radical strategy
as a commitment not to intervene. A commitment to stochastic intervention would typically
do the trick. Indeed, if the agency could commit to saving all lives in each country with
probability p < 1, then it could greatly reduce the extent of man-made famines. The Bellman
equation of a dictator under such policy would be:
V (ni) = max
si∈[0,1]
ln[ni(1− sic¯)] + β (pV (ni) + (1− p)V (sini)) (6)
The policy function of such problem is given by:
si(ni) =


β(1−p)
(1−βp)c¯
if β(1−p)
1−βp
< c¯
1 otherwise
(7)
Clearly, if we were in a corner solution in the no-aid scenario, there would exist p? such that
the agency would not aggravate things if it could commit to intervene only with probability
lower than p?. Unfortunately, the agency will always renege on its commitment ex post, if
any kleptocrat chooses to call its bluff. The agency’s objective to save lives will always make
it impossible for it not to intervene if it has the budget to act. Such is the food aid curse we
wish to address in this paper.
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2.2 Addressing the food aid curse
It is far from trivial to solve the commitment problem facing an aid agency whose objective
is to minimize the number of deaths from starvation. Clearly, if the aid agency and the
kleptocrats agree to some form of cooperation at time t, there is no way the aid agency
will deny intervention if a kleptocrat deviates from the agreement and generates a massive
famine. The punishment for such deviation has to take place in the future and must involve
all agreeing parties. The only way for the agency to commit not to intervene in the whole
future in the deviating country is to divide, from t + 1 onward, all its budget between the
countries that did not deviate at t and for the latter to set si as low as possible given the
agency’s budget, i.e. si = 1−B/[(N−1)c¯]. Still this punishment profile will only be credible
if the agency does not have a left-over budget once it feeds all starving agents in all N − 1
non-deviating countries: B ≤ (N − 1)c¯. The agency’s strategy profile will involve a gift g
delivered at the end of each period to all complying countries. The following proposition
formalizes this intuition. Strategies are assumed to be implemented at the beginning of the
game, i.e. at n = 1. A more general formulation, i.e. for n < 1, is possible.
Proposition 3 The following strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and
only if B ∈ [Ng, (N − 1)c¯]. The aid agency requests si = 1 for all i and extends complying
parties a gift in the amount of g at the end of each period, and the kleptocrats choose si =
1 for all i, as long as no one deviates. In any subgame following a deviation, the agency
and the N − 1 non-deviants act as in Proposition 2b with n˜ now defined as B
(N−1)c¯
. The gift
g is as follows:
g =


c¯ + (1− c¯)β − 1 if β ≥ c¯ ;
c¯ + (1− β)β
(
β
c¯
) β2
1−β − 1 otherwise .
(8)
The gift is chosen so that no kleptocrat has an incentive to deviate if the others do not,
i.e. g is such that he is indifferent between complying today and not complying given that
the future will unfold as in the benchmark. Formally, g solves:
1
1− β
ln[(1− c¯) + g] = max
si∈[0,1]
ln[(1− sic¯)] + βV
b(1) (9)
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It can easily be shown, using the closed-form expression for the benchmark value function,
that g must be as in equation (8). Both expressions in equation (8) are decreasing functions
of β: the lower the discount factor, the lower the importance of the punishment in the
kleptocrat’s utility. Obviously, the agency needs a sufficient budget to expend such gifts. It
must be that Ng ≤ B for this equilibrium to exist. This is captured by the lower bound of
admissible budgets in the proposition.
However, we need to make sure that there exists an admissible budget, i.e. that the
interval’s upper bound is not lower than the lower bound. For the interval in Proposition
3 to exist, it must be that that Ng ≤ (N − 1)c¯. In the case of β ≥ c¯, this is equivalent to
finding conditions under which 1/Nc¯ + (1− c¯)β − 1 ≤ 0. With a little algebra, we can show
that a sufficient condition is β ≥ 1/N . In the case β < c¯, it can be shown that β ≥ 1/2
is sufficient. In infinite horizon games such as ours, conditions on the discount factor are
quite typical to insure the existence of equilibria involving a threat of future punishment.
For the kleptocrats to comply with the aid agency’s plan, they must value the future enough
to outweigh the benefits of not complying in the present.
It should be noted that in our proposed equilibrium, no kleptocrat finds it optimal to
deviate from his strategy. The punishment will never be implemented, but the punishment
phase is itself a Nash perfect equilibrium. Indeed, once the agency has bailed out a cheater,
the game becomes an (N − 1)-player replica of the food aid curse, in which each kleptocrat
behaves according to Proposition 2b.
3 Discussion
What if the agency has a small budget, i.e. smaller than what is needed to extend the gift
to all kleptocrats? Then the results above will hold in a subset of countries corresponding
exactly to B/g. The others will be left in autarky. This result is somewhat uninteresting
since the agency’s whole budget will have to be used every period to bribe dictators not to
starve their population.
The reader could argue that one of the policy implications of our analysis is for humani-
tarian aid agencies to self-destruct, at least when the discount factor is large. Clearly, such
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cannot be the case, however. Many famines have natural causes; our model does not en-
compass these. Yet all our qualitative results would carry through in a model in which the
aid agency can determine whether the cause of the famine is natural or human. This is not
a bad assumption, as aid agencies have become experts in the art of determining disaster
causes and can easily draw the line between a natural disaster and one that is not so natural.
See, for instance, USAID (2006) for an overview of its interventions that year.
Throughout the paper, we have been confronted with two scenarios with respect to the
value of a kleptocrat’s discount factor, β, relative to the survival consumption as a percentage
of per capita output, c¯. The case β ≥ c¯ is likely if the kleptocrats rule over relatively wealthy
countries for which c¯ is not a large fraction of y. The other case is more likely in extremely
poor countries, for which output barely covers survival consumption. Both scenarios can
be found simultaneously in different parts of the world. Rewriting the model to account for
possible income inequality between possible aid recipients is feasible and would not affect the
basic results of the paper. It would, however, make the exposition unnecessarily complex.
Our analysis suggests that one way to avoid man-made famines while solving the food
aid curse is to bribe dictators on a regular basis, so to speak.2 This highlights a new role
for international aid, that of a famine-prevention mechanism. Doing so is cheaper in the
end and more effective than acting non-strategically. Furthermore, it reduces the extent of
kleptocracy. Of course, development aid is not typically meant to be a bribe. We do not
claim that all of foreign aid needs to be used as such. Our paper simply makes the case that
it may not be a bad thing if a fraction of foreign aid is explicitly used as a bribe to buy out
incentives for future man-made famines.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2b
Here we deal with the case where each country has a population n (initially equal to 1) and
the agency, having a budget B < Nnc¯, plays non-strategically, i.e. sends aid unconditionally
wherever needed. We derive the dictator’s optimal policy function s∗i (ni) and value function
V ∗(ni).
We will look for a symmetric equilibrium to this problem. In equilibrium, therefore,
each dictator chooses the same policy function s∗i (·) = s
∗(·) and expects to receive B/N or
whatever is needed to save his entire population from hunger, whichever is less. That is, he
receives
a ≡ c¯ ·min{n˜, (1− s)n} . (10)
where, we remind the reader, n˜ = B/(Nc¯). Population evolves according to
n′ = sn +
a
c¯
= min{sn + n˜, n} . (11)
Equations (10) and (11) have two immediate consequences. First, the population never falls
below n˜, since that is how many people the agency can save even if the dictator sets s = 0.
Second, n′ = n whenever s ≥ s¯(n) ≡ 1 − (n˜/n); this means that it is never optimal for the
dictator to set s above s¯(n). Thus
s∗(n) ∈ [0, s¯(n)] for all n. (12)
The population level n˜ is particularly important. Since s¯(n˜) = 0, the optimal policy function
at this level must necessarily be s∗(n˜) = 0. This leads to n′ = n˜, so the same solution must
hold next period, and so on. The value function is therefore
V ∗(n˜) = ln(n˜) / (1− β) . (13)
So once a dictator finds it optimal to set s = 0, he will continue to do so forever, and the
population will remain at n˜.
When n > n˜, however, the problem is less trivial. The value to be maximized is
V (n) = max
s
ln[n(1− sc¯)] + βV (n′) (14)
where n′ is given by (11).
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Claim 1. If β ≥ c¯, then in equilibrium s∗(n) = s¯(n) for all n > n˜.
Proof. The derivative of the right-hand side of (14) with respect to s is
(
−c¯
1−sc¯
)
+ βV ′(n′)
∂n′
∂s
(15)
We submit that s = s¯(n) is the optimal policy function and that
V¯ (n) ≡
(
1
1−β
)
ln[n(1− s¯(n)c¯)] (16)
is the associated value function. To verify this, use V (n) = V¯ (n) in (15). The expression
obtained is discontinuous at s = s¯(n), but negative for s > s¯(n) and non-negative for s < s¯(n)
— in fact strictly positive for s < s¯(n) if β is strictly greater than c¯. Moreover, V (n) = V¯ (n)
and s = s¯(n) together satisfy (14). 2
That establishes the part of Proposition 2b dealing with the case where β ≥ c¯. The rest
of this appendix assumes β < c¯.
Claim 2. In equilibrium s∗(n) < s¯(n) for all n > n˜.
Proof. Suppose s¯(n) is optimal. Then n′ = n and the same situation recurs next period.
The value function in this case is V¯ , defined in (16).
But consider what happens if instead the dictator sets s(n) = s¯(n) −  for one period
[where  < s(n)] and then s(n) = s¯(n) thereafter. Then his value, which we denote by Vˆ , is
Vˆ (n, ) = ln n + ln[1− c¯s¯(n) + c¯] + βV¯ (n′) (17)
where n′ = ns¯(n) − n + n˜ = n(1− ). It is straightforward to show that, for all n, Vˆ (n, )
approaches V¯ (n) as  goes to zero, and that Vˆ (n, ) is increasing in  at  = 0. Consequently
there exists  > 0 such that Vˆ (n, ) > V¯ (n) for all n, proving that V¯ (n) is not optimal. 2
As a result of this claim, n′ < n whenever n > n˜. The population declines, in other words.
The question is, does it reach n = n˜ in finite time? The next claim shows that it does.
Claim 3. Eventually s∗(n) = 0 becomes optimal.
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Proof. Suppose s = 0 is never optimal. Then we must have 0 < s∗(n) < s¯(n) for all n.
Therefore s∗(n) must be the solution to
V (n) = max
s
ln n + ln(1− sc¯) + βV (n′) , (18)
where n′ = ns + n˜ and s is unconstrained. But the solution to this problem is
V (n) = K +
(
1
1−β
)
ln
[
n +
(
n˜c¯
1− c¯
)]
; (19)
s(n) =
(
β
c¯
)
−
(
1−β
1−c¯
)(
n˜
n
)
; (20)
where K is defined in the paragraph following Proposition 1. The policy function given by
(20) generates the following population equation:
n′ =
(
β
c¯
)
n−
(
c¯−β
1−c¯
)
n˜ . (21)
According to this, n must eventually fall below n˜, which can only happen if s < 0. This is
impossible. The constraint s ≥ 0 must therefore become binding at some point. 2
The dictator will therefore set s = 0 at some point; and as we have seen, once he sets
s = 0 he will continue to do so always. Let nt denote the population at date t. Let T be the
first period in which the dictator sets s = 0. Then we must have
V ∗(nT ) = ln nT + βV
∗(n˜) . (22)
We may work backwards from T . Note that T is the last period where nt > n˜.
At T − 1 the solution satisfies s > 0. This must be an interior solution to
V (nT−1) = max
s
ln nT−1 + ln(1− sc¯) + βV
∗(nT ) , (23)
where nT = snT−1 + n˜. The optimal policy function is
s∗(nT−1) =
βnT−1 − n˜c¯
nT−1c¯(1− β)
; (24)
and the corresponding value function is
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V ∗(nT−1) = (1 + β) ln(ni,T−1 + n˜c¯)− (1 + β) ln(1 + β)
+β ln(β/c¯) + β2V ∗(n˜) . (25)
Substituting the policy function into the population equation, we see that nT > n˜ implies
nT−1 > (c¯/β)n˜. This means that the results obtained for T , namely s
∗(nT ) and V
∗(nT ), are
valid for n˜ < nT ≤ (c¯/β)n˜. Conversely, if n˜ < nt ≤ (c¯/β)n˜, then t = T and the optimal
action is s = 0.
This analysis may be repeated as many times as necessary. In general we have
s∗(nT−k) =
∑k
j=1[β
jnT−k − c¯
jn˜]
c¯nT−k
∑k
j=0 β
j
; (26)
V ∗(nT−k) =
∑k
j=0
βj
[
ln
(
nT−k + n˜
∑k
l=1
c¯l
)
− ln
(∑k
l=0
βl
)]
+
∑k
j=1
jβj ln(β/c¯) + βk+1V ∗(n˜) . (27)
The value of k, which is the number of periods until the dictator begins setting s = 0, depends
on the current population. Specifically, nt = nT−k if and only if h(k) < nt ≤ h(k +1), where
h(k) is defined as follows:
h(k) ≡


(
ck
∑k−1
j=0 β
j
βk
)
−
k−1∑
j=1
c¯j

 n˜ . (28)
Consider the following example. Let c¯ = 2/3, β = 1/2, and B/N = 1/4. Then one can
calculate h(1) = 1/2, h(2) = 3/4, h(3) = 41/36, and so on. Initially n1 = 1, which falls
between h(2) and h(3). Thus the dictator is two periods away from setting s = 0. In the
first period (i.e. T − 2) he sets s = 2/7, which leads to n2 = 37/56. Naturally this falls
between h(1) and h(2). The dictator then sets s = 9/74, which leads to n3 = 51/112. This
is less than h(1), and so the dictator sets s = 0. He does this in every subsequent period.
From period 4 onward the population is n˜ = 3/8.
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